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Monday, March 1, 2010
SYM. Antithesis: A: Reality
"This is the construct. It is our loading program. We can load anything from clothing, to equipment, weapons, training simulations, anything we need."
Morpheus reveals the digital nature of the setting in the scene. It is the opposite of Neo's habitual belief of the substative "real" world: everything can simply be loaded.
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SYM. Antithesis: B: Appearance
"Your clothes are different. The plugs in your arms and head are gone. Your hair has changed."
Neo is seeing himself as such an image because has been programmed by the Matrix to believe what he perceives is true. However, the image is merely an illusory appearance of the reality, rather than the reality itself. In other words, Neo is confusing his Avatar with his true self.
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SYM. Antithesis: A: Appearance
"Two chairs appear in front of them, and Neo reaches out to touch one. He runs his hand along it's back."
The sudden appearance of the chairs indicates their illusionary nature. Neo is deceived by the appearance because he "reaches out to touch one", even though it is merely the output of a computer program that is projected into Neo's consciousness.
Of course, Neo's image himself is an appearance as well, as indicated previously. The only way he can make sure that he is a real existence rather than a program is by checking his thinking process and self-awareness. This is René Descartes's "Cogito ergo sum".
The Matrix is a thought experiment to convey the problem that everything that we perceive might be an illusion. Some other similar thought experiments are: Hillary Putnam's thought experiment of Brains in a vat and Plato's Allegory of the Cave.
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SEM. Control
"Morpheus changes the channel on the televison."
Morpheus could manipulate the reality of the television by changing the channel. This control process signifies the control (of the architect) over the Matrix. The channels of the television are like the programs of the Matrix: they are all created by a higher being, the former by men, the latter by the architect, and thus are both subject to the control of their creator. The creator of the Matrix, therefore, is going to be able to control the Matrix by coding its programs, just like controlling the television by changing the channel.
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SEM. New/one
"Neo"
Neo in latin means new. It's also an anagram of "one". Thomas Anderson, Neo's given name relates to 'doubting Thomas' in the bible when he doesn't believe he is the One. Anderson means 'son of man' which is a messianic title.
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SEM. Fashioner
"Morpheus"
Morpheus means the fashioner or molder, because of the shapes he calls up before the sleeper, in classical mythology. He is the god of dreams, which ties in with the sleep/dream theme that runs throughout the Matrix.Go back to the Matrix
Sunday, February 28, 2010
SEM. Simulacrum — a failure to represent/refer
"This is the world that you know. The world as it was at
the end of the twentieth century. It exists now only as
part of a neural-interactive simulation, that _we_ call
the Matrix."
the end of the twentieth century. It exists now only as
part of a neural-interactive simulation, that _we_ call
the Matrix."
Morpheus is telling Neo that he has been living in inside the "map", not the "territory", as Baudrillard famously cites Borges in his Simulacrum and Simulation.
Putnam Hilary’s thought experiment of a brain in a vat illustrates a similar idea. He argues that a brain in a vat cannot meaningfully express the idea that “I am a brain in a vat” because by saying “brain” and “vat”, it is not referring to the brains and vats real-life people have experienced; instead, it was the electrical signals conceive me to believe are brains and vats.
Even though Neo has just briefly experienced the “real” world of Zion, his judgment of reality is still based on his memory and habitual belief in the Matrix. Therefore, his concept of the real is a simulation rather than a representation. In other words, it is the true, but not the real; it is a hyper-real.
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Virtual Reality
Virtual reality (VR) is a computer-simulated environment, whether that environment is a simulation of the real world or an imaginary world.
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Is Zion more real than the Matrix? — a philosophical exploration
Is Zion more real than the Matrix?
Or are they equivalent?
Is virtual reality ontologically parallel to actual reality?
If according to skepticism, our perception can always deceive us and we can never have any knowledge of the external world, then the differentiation between the "real" world and the "illusionary" world means nothing to us. Therefore, Matrix is as "real", or "illusionary" as Zion, and virtual reality can be just like "reality" for us if we are immersed in it.
At the same time, Baudrillard also intelligibly argues that: "All western faith and good faith became engaged in this wager on representation: that a sign could refer to the depth of meaning, that a sign could be exchanged for meaning and that something could guarantee this exchange — God of course. But what if God himself can be simulated, that is to say can be reduced to the signs that constitute faith? Then the whole system becomes weightless, it is no longer itself anything but a gigantic simulacrum — not unreal, but a simulacrum, that is to say never exchanged for the real, but exchanged for itself, in an uninterrupted circuit without reference or circumference." (The Precession of Simulacra, Jean Baudrillard)
Therefore, we seem to reach the uneasy conclusion that there is no "truth". "the simulacrum is never what hides the truth — it is truth that hides the fact that there is none. The simulation is true." --- Ecclesiastes
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Or are they equivalent?
Is virtual reality ontologically parallel to actual reality?
If according to skepticism, our perception can always deceive us and we can never have any knowledge of the external world, then the differentiation between the "real" world and the "illusionary" world means nothing to us. Therefore, Matrix is as "real", or "illusionary" as Zion, and virtual reality can be just like "reality" for us if we are immersed in it.
At the same time, Baudrillard also intelligibly argues that: "All western faith and good faith became engaged in this wager on representation: that a sign could refer to the depth of meaning, that a sign could be exchanged for meaning and that something could guarantee this exchange — God of course. But what if God himself can be simulated, that is to say can be reduced to the signs that constitute faith? Then the whole system becomes weightless, it is no longer itself anything but a gigantic simulacrum — not unreal, but a simulacrum, that is to say never exchanged for the real, but exchanged for itself, in an uninterrupted circuit without reference or circumference." (The Precession of Simulacra, Jean Baudrillard)
Therefore, we seem to reach the uneasy conclusion that there is no "truth". "the simulacrum is never what hides the truth — it is truth that hides the fact that there is none. The simulation is true." --- Ecclesiastes
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SEM. the Matrix
"A television"
The television here, as a device in the program that's used to project image of the "real world" into the program, is clearly another lower level of simulacrum in the simulacrum (the Matrix) itself. It is a representation of the Matrix itself.
This indicates Neo has been blinded to the reality by the Matrix. Television, the "idiot box, is used here as a metaphor to stand for the medium of stupification and control.
Is there a way out? Stuwart Moulthrop argues in his You Say You Want a Revolution? Hypertext and the Laws of Media that“...this being the case, hypertext could hardly claim to represent “a cure for television stupor.”
Then could Zion be the cure for "the Matrix stupor?"
A path to Zion
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SEM. Entrance to the Matrix
"the television control"
The television control as a signifier signifies the entrance to the Matrix (the Signified).
Or, is it just a link between the parallel realities of the Matrix and Zion?
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REF. Skepticism
One explanation from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
A way to motivate Academic Skepticism and to clearly distinguish it from ordinary incredulity is to trace the way in which Descartes expanded the realm of what was doubtful (and hence not worthy of assent) in the “First Meditation.”[7] Descartes begins by noting that the senses have deceived him on some occasions and, in the voice of his skeptical interlocutor, he conjectures that it is never prudent to trust what occasionally misleads. So, we don't have “certain” knowledge of the external world based upon the testimony of our senses. However, in the voice of the non-skeptical interlocutor, he replies that even though the senses have misled him, he can neutralize that purported basis for doubt by pointing out that we are able to determine when our senses are not trustworthy. Thus, this is a case of ordinary incredulity because he appeals to some knowledge of the world gained through our senses to neutralize this basis for doubt. For example, in looking at a straight stick in water, even though it appears bent, we know not to accept the testimony of our senses at face value. We can neutralize the potentially knowledge-robbing proposition that my senses have deceived me on some occasions by adding to it another proposition to which we assent, namely, I can distinguish between the occasions when my senses are trustworthy and those when they are not. Some propositions in the EI-type (propositions about the external world) can be used to rebuff the grounds for ordinary incredulity. Thus, no basis for (philosophical) Academic Skepticism has been located.
Descartes next considers dreaming. What if he were dreaming at that very moment? Would he still have some knowledge of the external world? Yes; because in dreams and in waking life there are some common general features. So, if he were dreaming, he would not know in particular what is going on about him at that moment, but that does not imply that he fails to have any knowledge at that moment. For example, he still could know that there are hands. More importantly, even more simple things about nature “in general” are not thereby made doubtful. We have not found any reason for doubting that there are material objects or that they have a spatial location, or are in motion or at rest, or can exist for a long or short period of time. Again, no basis for Academic Skepticism has been established.
But then Descartes thinks of a grounds for doubt for which he says he “certainly has no reply.” He puts it this way:
… In whatever way [it is supposed] that I have arrived at the state of being that I have reached — whether [it is attributed] to fate or to accident, or [made] out that it is by a continual succession of antecedents, or by some other method — since to err and deceive oneself is a defect, it is clear that the greater will be the probability of my being so imperfect as to deceive myself ever, as is the Author of my being to whom [is assigned] my origin the less powerful. (Meditations, 147)
In other words, at this point in the Meditations, since he lacks an argument for the claim that whatever is causally responsible for his “state of being” is capable of making his being such that to err would not be natural for it, assenting to propositions arrived at by his “state of being” is not legitimate. Thus, Descartes believes that he has located a basis for doubting all of his supposed former knowledge of the external world that cannot be repulsed by locating another such proposition to which he is entitled. He has found a proposition that, if true, would (by itself) defeat the justification he has for his assenting to propositions about the external world and which is such that (1) he does not (at least at this point in the Meditations) have a way to reject it and such that (2) he has no way to neutralize its effect. Thus, a basis for philosophical skepticism has been found because an entire class of EI-type propositions — propositions that his “nature” has led him to assent to — is now thrown into doubt because he cannot use one member of the class to reject or neutralize the basis for doubting another member of the class.
Descartes apparently thinks that something is worthy of assent only if it is immune to genuine doubt. It appears that he thinks that something, d, is a grounds for genuine doubt of p for S iff:
1. d added to S's beliefs makes assent to p no longer adequately justified;
2. S is not justified in denying d;[8]
3. S has no way to neutralize d.[9]
The final step is to say that some proposition is not worthy of assent if there are genuine grounds for doubting it. Indeed, Descartes grants that even after d is located, p might still be more reasonable to believe than to deny (Meditations, 148). The point is that the pro-attitude should not rise to the level required for knowledge because there is a genuine ground for doubt. Thus, a crucial feature of the Cartesian-style argument for Academic Skepticism is that it employs a very stringent requirement on the type of evidence required for knowledge. It must make a proposition immune to genuine doubt.
A way to motivate Academic Skepticism and to clearly distinguish it from ordinary incredulity is to trace the way in which Descartes expanded the realm of what was doubtful (and hence not worthy of assent) in the “First Meditation.”[7] Descartes begins by noting that the senses have deceived him on some occasions and, in the voice of his skeptical interlocutor, he conjectures that it is never prudent to trust what occasionally misleads. So, we don't have “certain” knowledge of the external world based upon the testimony of our senses. However, in the voice of the non-skeptical interlocutor, he replies that even though the senses have misled him, he can neutralize that purported basis for doubt by pointing out that we are able to determine when our senses are not trustworthy. Thus, this is a case of ordinary incredulity because he appeals to some knowledge of the world gained through our senses to neutralize this basis for doubt. For example, in looking at a straight stick in water, even though it appears bent, we know not to accept the testimony of our senses at face value. We can neutralize the potentially knowledge-robbing proposition that my senses have deceived me on some occasions by adding to it another proposition to which we assent, namely, I can distinguish between the occasions when my senses are trustworthy and those when they are not. Some propositions in the EI-type (propositions about the external world) can be used to rebuff the grounds for ordinary incredulity. Thus, no basis for (philosophical) Academic Skepticism has been located.
Descartes next considers dreaming. What if he were dreaming at that very moment? Would he still have some knowledge of the external world? Yes; because in dreams and in waking life there are some common general features. So, if he were dreaming, he would not know in particular what is going on about him at that moment, but that does not imply that he fails to have any knowledge at that moment. For example, he still could know that there are hands. More importantly, even more simple things about nature “in general” are not thereby made doubtful. We have not found any reason for doubting that there are material objects or that they have a spatial location, or are in motion or at rest, or can exist for a long or short period of time. Again, no basis for Academic Skepticism has been established.
But then Descartes thinks of a grounds for doubt for which he says he “certainly has no reply.” He puts it this way:
… In whatever way [it is supposed] that I have arrived at the state of being that I have reached — whether [it is attributed] to fate or to accident, or [made] out that it is by a continual succession of antecedents, or by some other method — since to err and deceive oneself is a defect, it is clear that the greater will be the probability of my being so imperfect as to deceive myself ever, as is the Author of my being to whom [is assigned] my origin the less powerful. (Meditations, 147)
In other words, at this point in the Meditations, since he lacks an argument for the claim that whatever is causally responsible for his “state of being” is capable of making his being such that to err would not be natural for it, assenting to propositions arrived at by his “state of being” is not legitimate. Thus, Descartes believes that he has located a basis for doubting all of his supposed former knowledge of the external world that cannot be repulsed by locating another such proposition to which he is entitled. He has found a proposition that, if true, would (by itself) defeat the justification he has for his assenting to propositions about the external world and which is such that (1) he does not (at least at this point in the Meditations) have a way to reject it and such that (2) he has no way to neutralize its effect. Thus, a basis for philosophical skepticism has been found because an entire class of EI-type propositions — propositions that his “nature” has led him to assent to — is now thrown into doubt because he cannot use one member of the class to reject or neutralize the basis for doubting another member of the class.
Descartes apparently thinks that something is worthy of assent only if it is immune to genuine doubt. It appears that he thinks that something, d, is a grounds for genuine doubt of p for S iff:
1. d added to S's beliefs makes assent to p no longer adequately justified;
2. S is not justified in denying d;[8]
3. S has no way to neutralize d.[9]
The final step is to say that some proposition is not worthy of assent if there are genuine grounds for doubting it. Indeed, Descartes grants that even after d is located, p might still be more reasonable to believe than to deny (Meditations, 148). The point is that the pro-attitude should not rise to the level required for knowledge because there is a genuine ground for doubt. Thus, a crucial feature of the Cartesian-style argument for Academic Skepticism is that it employs a very stringent requirement on the type of evidence required for knowledge. It must make a proposition immune to genuine doubt.
REF. Cognitive Science
"What _is_ real? How do you _define_ real? If you're
talking about what you can feel, what you can smell, what
you can taste and see, then real is simply electrical
signals interpreted by your brain."
talking about what you can feel, what you can smell, what
you can taste and see, then real is simply electrical
signals interpreted by your brain."
REF. Cognitive Science: Cognitive Science has revealed the mechanism of the electrical signals in our brain that enable us to perceive the world.
REF. Skepticism
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SYM. Antithesis: B: Reality
"This is the mental projection... of your digital self."
Morpheus tells Neo the digital and projective nature of his seemingly life-like appearance.
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REF. Psychological theories (RSI)
Avatar:
An avatar is a computerized representation of a human or a program in human guise that appears within the Matrix or similar computerized virtual world.
An avatar projects what the humans call a residual self image (or RSI).
RSI:
The RSI is typically an idealized subjective perception of the human's appearance. Neo's appearance in the Construct when Morpheus first tells him of the truth of the Matrix is an example of an RSI placed on Neo's avatar.
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An avatar is a computerized representation of a human or a program in human guise that appears within the Matrix or similar computerized virtual world.
An avatar projects what the humans call a residual self image (or RSI).
RSI:
The RSI is typically an idealized subjective perception of the human's appearance. Neo's appearance in the Construct when Morpheus first tells him of the truth of the Matrix is an example of an RSI placed on Neo's avatar.
Go back to the Matrix
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